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THE CJEU AS AN INNOVATOR – A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNET RELATED CASE-LAW
by
ULF MAUNSBACH*
In this  paper  I  will  use  concepts  from  innovation  theory  to analyse  the work
of the Court  of Justice  of the European  Union in its  important  role  as sole
interpreter of EU law. In that regard, I define ‘innovator’ as one that facilitates use
of new or existing inventions. Thus innovation is portrayed as a process in which
several  actors  may  contribute  and where  it  all  starts  with  an invention
(the solution)  and it  ends  with  the innovation  (the process  of making  use
of the invention).  The Court of Justice of the European Union may be an inventor
in as  much as it  is  allowed to invent  solutions  in order  to solve  new or existing
problems, and it may be innovative in as much as it hands down judgments that
shall be followed (i.e. it makes use of the invention).
The  substance  of the paper  deals  with  case-law  from  the Court  of Justice
of the European  Union in the field  of cross-border  infringements.  The cases  will
be analysed  in relation  to the idea  that  legal  decision-making  can  be  described
as an innovative  process.  An approach  like  this  makes  it  possible  to draw
conclusions  regarding  the Court  of Justice  of the European  Unions ability
to innovate. It will be apparent that the Court is primarily concerned with so called
reactive  innovation  (i.e.  innovation  that  builds  on existing  knowledge).  Only
in exceptional  circumstances  do  we  find  examples  where  the Court  has  proved
to conduct  in proactive  innovation  (i.e.  inventing  and applying  new  solutions)
and this  may,  according  to the author,  prove  to be  a preferred  standard.  Better
to drive safely than to drive in the ditch.
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1. INTRODUCTION
If law were described as a construction that had the ability to be innovative,
as I  think  it  should  be,  the actors  in the legal  market  –  using  innovation
theory terminology – are important entrepreneurs and a necessary driving
force  in the innovation  process.1 Among  such  actors  are  the courts,
and in the  realm  of EU  law,  the most  important  is  the Court  of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU). 
The  CJEU,  with  its  monopoly  on interpretation  of EU  law  and its
capacity  to hand  down  judgments  that  shall  be  followed  by courts
in Member  States  may  be  defined  as both  a potential  inventor
and a potential innovator. It may be an inventor in as much as it is allowed
to solve  problems  with  new  solutions  (e.g.  invent  new  solutions  to new
or existing  problems),  and it  may  be  innovative  in as  much  as it  hands
down judgments  that  are  decisive,  e.g.  there  is  a guarantee  that  the new
suggested  solution  will  be  used  by others,  which  generally  is  a central
prerequisite for innovation.2
In this  paper,  I  have no ambition to develop the idea to describe legal
decision-making  in terms  of innovation,  but  I  will  use  concepts  from
innovation  theory  to analyse  the work  of the CJEU  in its  important  role
as sole interpreter of EU law. In that regard, I define “innovator” as one that
facilitates use of new or existing inventions.  Thus innovation is portrayed
as a process in which several actors may contribute and where it all starts
with  an invention  (the  solution)  it  ends  with  the innovation  (the process
of making use of the invention). 
In relation to innovative legal decision-making, I have previously argued
in favour of an approach that accentuates that the better innovator may be
the actor that possesses the ability to listen, i.e. pick up inventive solutions
1 See e.g Schumpeter, J.A. (1934) the Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University
Press.;  Rosenberg,  N.  and Birdzell,  L.E.  (1986)  How  the West  Grew  Rich  –  the Economic
Transformation  of the Industrial  World.  Basic  Books.;  Salzberger,  Eli  M.,  (ed.)  (2012)  Law
and Economics of Innovations. Edward Elgar.
2 See Maunsbach, U. (2017) How to Facilitate Legal Innovations - Like Home Cooking with a Twist
[Online].  Owen Dixon Society eJournal. Available from: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/
odsej/10 [Accessed 12 June 2017].
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among  the actors  in the legal  market  and make  use  of them,  rather  than
the actor  that  possesses  the ability  to invent.  Irrespective  of the efficiency
aspect  –  that  it  is  an advantage  to benefit  from  the work  already  done
by others  –  it  is  clear  that  the inventor  ought  to be  separated  from
the innovator. Although these two quite frequently coincide – the inventor
and the innovator might very well be the same actor – it is essential to stress
that their skills differ. The inventor needs to be creative and focused (even
narrow minded), whereas the innovator, as already stated, needs to listen,
be  open-minded  and be  ready  to make  use  of inventive  solutions
irrespective of their origin. 
Henceforth  case-law  from  the CJEU  in the field  of cross-border
infringements  will  be  analysed  in relation  to the idea  that  legal  decision-
making can be described as an innovative process. An approach like this not
only provides the author with a possibility to go through a number of cases
that  have already been studied exhaustively,  it also (and hopefully more
importantly) makes it possible to draw new conclusions in relation to CJEU
actions  regarding  this  important  institution’s  ability  to innovate.  It  also
allows  for  some  conclusions  as to  whether  or not  the CJEU  is  building
on existing knowledge or inventing new solutions, i.e.  if innovations from
the CJEU are reactive or proactive.
From this  starting  point,  I  have  decided  to take  a new  look
at the increasing  case-load  that  deals  with  Internet  related  infringements
(of different  sorts).  The aim  in this  paper  is  to shed  new  light
on the on-going  development  and,  if possible,  to say  something  about
the innovativeness  in relation  to how  the CJEU  is  approaching  problems
related  to the Internet.  While  analysing  cases,  I  will  primarily  focus
on the court’s  assessment  of jurisdiction,  i.e.  how the court  is  interpreting
different rules in the Brussels Ia regulation,3 and not include various aspects
that  regard  the interpretation  of rules  in other  instruments.  Particular
attention will  be  paid to the CJEU’s  argument  in relation to how Internet
related problems are supposed to be handled, not only including arguments
3 In this  paper  I  will  generally  refer  to Regulation  (EU)  No. 1215/2012  of the European
Parliament  and of the Council  of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters  (Brussels  Ia  Regulation),
although most of the case-law analysed are actually interpreting its predecessor,  Council
Regulation  (EC)  No  44/2001  of 22  December  2000  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments in civil  and commercial  matters.  as regards the issues that
are being dealt with in this  paper the substantive rules are the same in both Regulations
and I have therefore, throughout the paper, consistently taken the liberty of updating cases
with references to the corresponding articles of the new regulation.
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it  aims  at answering  but  also  the questions  that  are  actually  dealt  with
in the case.  Put differently, I will try to identify the solutions that are put
forward by the CJEU, acknowledging the fact that the analytical framework
is decided  by the preliminary  questions  and that  some  of the reasoning
is obiter dictum.
The structure  of the paper  is  straight  forward.  I  will  start  out  with
a presentation of the decided cases so far (until December 2016). Cases have
been  chosen  due  to their  relevance  in relation  to the fact  that  they  relate
to problems as to jurisdiction in Internet related cases. I will cover the cases
in chronological  order  starting  with  the Pammer  & Alpenhof case
of 7 December 2010 and ending with the Concurrence case of 21 December
2016.4
The purpose  of the presentation  is  to pinpoint  how  the CJEU
is addressing  Internet  related  problems  present  in each  case,
and throughout the analysis I will keep to the following structure. Starting
in Chapter  Two,  I  will  first  specify  the point  of law  that  is  relevant
in the case.  To a large  extent,  the national  courts  decide  this  inasmuch
as it is the courts of the Member States that actually formulate the questions
that  need  to be  answered.  It  may,  however,  be  necessary  to clarify
and/or rewrite  the original  questions,  and it  will  be  necessary  to skip
questions that aim at issues outside the scope of this paper. Secondly, I want
to clarify  the rule  of law  that  may  be  derived  from  the case.  This  is,
in the best  of worlds,  something  directly  provided  for  in the judgment,
and I will primarily, for obvious reasons, derive my rules of law from this
source.  It  may,  however,  be  necessary  to analyse  the rule  of law  in light
of the  reasoning,  and it  will  prove  possible  to rewrite  the judgment
into more  abstract  rules.  Finally,  I  will  focus  on the mode  of procedure,
e.g. how  the CJEU  have  actually  approached  the Internet  challenge.  It  is
primarily during this last  stage of the presentation that it will be possible
to say  something  about  the innovativeness  of the CJEU,  although  this
4 Case covered in this survey are:  C-144/09 & C-585/08 (Pammer and Alpenhof), 7 December
2010  (Grand  Chamber),  EU:C:2010:740;  C-509/09  &  C-161/10  (E-date  and Martinez),
25 October 2011 (Grand Chamber), EU:C:2011:685; C-523/10 (Wintersteiger), 19 April 2012
(First  Chamber),  EU:C:2012:220;  C-173/11  (Dataco),  18  October  2012  (Third  Chamber),
EU:C:2012:642;  C-170/12  (Pinckney),  3  October  2013  (Fourth  Chamber),  EU:C:2013:635;
C-387/12 (Hi Hotel), 3 April 2014 (Forth Chamber), EU:C:2014:215; C-360/12 (Coty Germany),
5 June 2014 (Forth Chamber),  EU:C:2014:1318; C-441/13 (Hejduk),  22 January 2015 (Forth
Chamber),  EU:C:2015:28;  C-322/14  (El  Majdoub)  21 May  2015  (Third  Chamber),
EU:C:2015:334  and Case  C-618/15  (Concurrence)  on 21 December  2016  (Third  Chamber),
EU:C:2016:976.
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analysis is primarily saved for the last section of the paper, Chapter Three,
during which a concluding analysis will be presented.
2. AN INNOVATION ANALYSIS OF CJEU CASE-LAW
2.1 PAMMER & ALPENHOF
2.1.1 POINT OF LAW
On 7  December  2009,  the Grand  Chamber  of the CJEU  delivered
its judgment in the joined  Pammer & Alpenhof  case.5 In this landmark case,
the CJEU had,  for  the first  time,  the opportunity  to interpret  the meaning
of “directed  activities”  in relation  to website  activities  within  the frames
of Article  17(1)c  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation.  The case  dealt  with  two
similar  situations.  In the Pammer case,  it  was  an Austrian  consumer  who
was arguing for jurisdiction in Austria in relation to a dispute with a trader
in Germany  that  according  to the plaintiff  (the  consumer)  had  directed
online  activities  to Austria  in a way  that  made  Article  17(1)c  applicable.
In the  Alpenhof case,  it  was  the other  way  around.  A trader  in Austria
initiated  proceedings  in Austria  against  a consumer  from  Germany,  who
counterclaimed that there was no jurisdiction in Austria due to the fact that
the trader  had  directed  online  activities  towards  Germany.  By doing  so,
the same  provision  was  made  applicable  (Article  17(1)c)
with the consequence  that  the German  consumer  should  benefit
from the protecting rule in Article  18,  stating that  a consumer always can
demand  that  a case  against  the consumer  is  to be  tried  in a court
in the country  of the consumers  domicile.  Both  cases  dealt  with  activities
conducted  on the Internet  and the core  issue  was  the interpretation
of Article 17(1)c in the Brussels Ia Regulation and the prerequisite
“directing  commercial  or professional  activities  to the Member  State
of the consumers domicile”.
The point of law of relevance dealt with in this case may consequently
be stated  in the following  way:  how  is  Article  17(1)c  in the Brussels  Ia
Regulation and the expression
“directing  commercial  or professional  activities  to the Member  state
of the consumers domicile”
5 Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver
Heller (2010)  joined cases  C-585/08 and C-144/09,  Court  of Justice  of the European Union
(Grand Chamber), 7 December. 
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to be  interpreted  in relation  to online  activities?  an alternative  way
of expressing this would be whether it is sufficient to be online or if some
other  website  activities  are  necessary  in order  for  a trader´s  action  to be
regarded  as directed  to the Member  State  of the consumer’s  domicile
in a way  that  makes  the consumer-protection  rules  in the Brussels  Ia
Regulation applicable.6
2.1.2 RULE OF LAW
The  rule  of law  that  can  be  derived  from  the judgment  in the Pammer
& Alpenhof case  may  be  framed  as follows:  if a trader  is  offering  goods
or services for online sales, the prerequisite “directing professional activities”
in Article  17(1)c  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation is  not  satisfied merely  due
to the  accessibility  of the trader’s  website;  but  if it  is  apparent
from the trader’s,  or an intermediary’s,  overall  website  activity  that
the trader  was  envisaging  doing  business  (i.e.  conclude  contracts)  with
consumers  in the  Member  State  of the consumer’s  domicile,
the requirements are satisfied.
The closer  assessment  as regards  the prerequisite  “directing  professional
activities” is  for the national  courts  to ascertain,  i.e.  whether  the overall
website  activity  in case  is  sufficient  for it  to be  regarded  as “directed
activity”.  The CJEU  provides  some  additional  help  in as much
as the judgment  includes  a non-exhaustive  list  of matters  that  may  be
evidence  in support  of a finding  that  a trader’s  activity  is  directed
to the Member  State  of the consumer’s  domicile.  The list  comprises  more
or less  obvious  matters,  and it  highlights  the importance  of prior
international  trade,  use  of language  and use  of currency.  It  also  places
importance on more Internet-related matters like the use of country specific
top-level  domains and marketing activities by way of Internet  referencing
services.
2.1.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
In its reasoning the CJEU is more elaborate than in the judgment. In relation
to the list  of factors  that  may  constitute  evidence  regarding  directed
activities, the CJEU differentiates between “patent evidence” and other items
6 Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver
Heller (2010)  joined cases C-585/08  and C-144/09,  Court  of Justice  of the European Union
(Grand Chamber), 7 December. § 47.
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of evidence.  Patent  evidence  would,  for example,  be  if it  is  mentioned
on the trade’s  website  that  the trader  is  offering  its  goods  or services
in the consumer’s  Member  Sate  or if the trader  has  had  expenditure
for marketing  activities  in the consumer’s  Member  State.  Other  items
of evidence  are  such  that,  in combination  with  each  other,  may  lead
to the conclusion that a trader’s  activities are directed to another  Member
State.  The list  in the judgment  includes  examples  from  the latter  group
but not examples of patent evidence. Presumably this is due to the fact that
patent evidence is regarded as obviously influential.7
The Pammer & Alpenhof case is a landmark case in as much as it discusses
how directed professional activities are to be interpreted for the first time.
In its reasoning, the Grand Chamber is attentive to specific Internet-related
circumstances,  and it  acknowledges  that  the vulnerability  of consumers
increases  due  to the development  of Internet  communication.8
Simultaneously, the CJEU shows an understanding as regards the fact that
commercial  online  activities  are  ubiquitous  and consequently  globally
assessable; it may prove difficult to delimit access to online offers, not least
in light of the fact  that there are mandatory requirements regarding some
information that needs to be provided in the case of services offered online.9
as a result,  the trader  must  have  manifested  its  intention  to conduct
business with the consumer in order to make Article 17(1)c applicable. 
The  Pammer  & Alpenhof case  may  be  framed  as an innovative  case,
in as much as it  shows that  the CJEU possesses  the ability  to be  attentive
– adopting functional principles – in relation to a new problem, i.e. to what
extent  Internet  related  activities  can  be  regarded  as directed  to a specific
Member  State.  In this  regard,  this  case,  and the rule  of law  that  may
be derived from it, could be defined as a case that illustrates that the CJEU
is  reactive  in its  capacity  as innovator.  It  actually  strives  to solve  a new
problem – by addressing the problem of how Internet related activities are
supposed to be demarcated – but the solution is not an invention; it is rather
7 Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver
Heller (2010)  joined cases  C-585/08 and C-144/09,  Court  of Justice  of the European Union
(Grand Chamber), 7 December. § 81–83.
8 Ibid., § 62.
9 Ibid.,  §  68  and 78,  with  further  reference  to Article  5(1)c  Directive  2000/31/EC
of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 8  June  2000  on certain  legal  aspects
of information  society  services,  in particular  electronic  commerce,  in the Internal  Market
(E-commerce  Directive).  Official  Journal  of the European  Union (2000/L  178/1)  17  July.
Available from: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj [Accessed 12 June 2017].
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an interpretation based on existing knowledge applied in relation to a new
problem.
2.2 EDATE AND MARTINEZ
2.2.1 POINT OF LAW
Almost  one  year  later,  on 25  October  2011,  the Grand  Chamber  had
the opportunity  to add  to the knowledge  as regards  Internet  related
activities in its judgment in the joined  eDate & Martinez cases.10 Both cases
deal with Internet-related defamation where the action – the event that gave
rise  to damage  –  was  located  in one  country  and potential  damages
in another.  In both  cases,  the plaintiff  sued  on basis  of the special
jurisdictional  rule  in Article  7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation,  but  not
in the country where  the tortious action took place and not in the country
where the defendants were domiciled. In the eDate case, proceedings were
brought  before  a court  in Germany  in relation  to actions  that  took  place
on a website in Austria, and in the Martinez case proceedings were brought
before  a French  court  in relation  to actions  that  took  place  on a website
in the UK.  In both  cases,  questions  arose  as to  whether  this  special  rule
on international jurisdiction in Article 7(2) was applicable.
In addition  to this  question,  the eDate case  also  includes  a question
as to applicable  law  and how  the e-commerce  directive  is  supposed
to be interpreted.  For the purpose  of this  paper,  however,  I  will  focus
on the question regarding jurisdiction.
The point of law – with relevance for this study – in both cases is how
the expression  “the  place  where  the harmful  event  occurred  or  may  occur”,
in Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, is to be interpreted in the case
of an alleged infringement of personality rights by means of content placed
online on an Internet website.
2.2.2 RULE OF LAW
The CJEU provides an answer narrowed down to the specific situation that
is  relevant  for a person  in the event  of an alleged  infringement
of personality  rights  by means  of content  placed  online  on an Internet
website.  In this  specific  situation,  the rule  of law  is  that  a person  who
10 eDate  Advertising  GmbH v. X and Olivier  Martinez,  Robert  Martinez  v. MGN Limited (2010)
joined  cases  C-509/09  and C-161/10,  Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  (Grand
Chamber), 25 October. 
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considers  that  his/her  rights  have  been  infringed  may  bring  an action
for liability  under  Article  7(2)  in respect  of all  the damage  caused  before
the courts  of the Member  State  in which  the centre  of his/her  interest
is based.
This  ruling,  seen  in light  of prior  case-law,  means  that  Article  7(2)
provides for three separate jurisdictional heads.  The first two are derived
from  prior  case-law.11 Firstly,  the plaintiff  may  bring  an action  before
the courts  of the Member  State  in which  the publisher  of the defamatory
content  is  established.  Secondly,  the plaintiff  may,  instead  of an action
for liability  in respect  of all  the damage  caused,  bring  an action  before
the courts  of each  Member  State  in the territory  of which  content  placed
online is or has been accessible. This latter group of courts have jurisdiction
only  in respect  of the damage  caused  in the territory  of the Member  State
of the  court  seized.  The third  option  is  the inventive  addition  that
is introduced  by the eDate  & Martinez case,  namely  a possibility
for the plaintiff  to bring  an action  covering  all  damage  caused  before
the courts of the Member State in which the centre of the plaintiffs’ interests
is based. 
2.2.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
In this  case,  the CJEU  is  indeed  both  an inventor  and innovator.
The introduction of a third jurisdictional head based on the plaintiff’s centre
of interest  is  a novel  solution.  It  is  likely  that  inspiration  is  derived
from similar solutions in common-law, where “centre of interest theories” are
quite  common12 –  but  the way  the CJEU  is  tailoring  this  idea  in relation
to online  infringements  of personality  rights  must  be  regarded
as an invention.  The reasoning  in this  regard  is  expressly  emphasising
the ubiquitous nature of the Internet. It initially departs from the Shevill case
– in which the second jurisdictional head of Article 7(2) was defined – and it
is  concluded  that  the two  connecting  criteria  in the Shevill case  would
provide the victim with a possibility to bring an action for damages against
the publisher  either  before  the courts  of the Member  State  of the place
where  the publisher  of the defamatory  publication  is established,  which
11 See further Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v. Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA (1976) case C-21/76,
Court  of Justice  of the European Union,  30 November.  EU:C:1976:166.  And Fiona  Shevill,
Ixora Trading Inc.,  Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International  Ltd v. Presse Alliance SA
(1995) case C-68/93, Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 March. 
12 See e.g. Shapira, A., the Interest Approach to Choice of Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
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have  jurisdiction  to award  damages  for  all  of the harm  caused
by the defamation,  or  before  the courts  of each  Member  State  in which
the publication  was  distributed  and where  the victim  claims  to have
suffered  injury  to his  reputation,  which  have  jurisdiction  to rule  solely
in respect of the harm caused in the State of the court seised.13
The  CJEU  then  concludes  that  the Internet  reduces  the usefulness
of the criterion defined in the Shevill  case.  It may prove difficult to delimit
damage  to a specific  Member  State  when  information  is  placed  online,
taking  account  to the ubiquitous  nature  of the Internet,  and the risk
of serious harm.14 The CJEU is specifically emphasising 
“the  serious  nature  of the harm  which  may  be  suffered  by the holder
of a personality  right  who  establishes  that  information  injurious  to that
right is available on a world-wide basis.”
It  is  in reaction  to these  considerations  that  the CJEU  decides  that
it is necessary  to invent  a new  jurisdictional  head  within  the frames
of Article 7(2).
Consequently,  the eDate  &  Martinez case  includes  an inventive  aspect
that  makes  this  case  an example  where  the CJEU may  be  said  to adhere
to proactive innovation rather than reactive.
2.3. WINTERSTEIGER 
2.3.1 POINT OF LAW
After the two landmark cases in 2010 and 2011, responsibility for the further
development  of case-law  was  handed  over to the separate  chambers
of the CJEU. Consequently,  on 19 April 2012, the First  Chamber  delivered
its  judgment  in the case  of Wintersteiger.15 The dispute  regards  use
of the Austrian,  nationally  registered,  trademark  “Wintersteiger”.
The Austrian  proprietor  of that  trademark  brought  an action  before
an Austrian  court,  claiming  that  the defendant,  a company  residing
13 eDate  Advertising  GmbH v. X and Olivier  Martinez,  Robert  Martinez  v. MGN Limited (2010)
joined  cases  C-509/09  and C-161/10,  Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  (Grand
Chamber),  25  October.  §  42,  with  further  reference  to Fiona  Shevill,  Ixora  Trading  Inc.,
Chequepoint SARL and Chequepoint International Ltd v. Presse Alliance SA (1995) case C-68/93,
Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 March. § 33.
14 eDate  Advertising  GmbH v. X and Olivier  Martinez,  Robert  Martinez  v. MGN Limited (2010)
joined  cases  C-509/09  and C-161/10,  Court  of Justice  of the European  Union  (Grand
Chamber), 25 October. § 45–47.
15 Wintersteiger  AG  v. Products  4U  Sondermaschinenbau  GmbH.  (2012)  case  C-523/10,  Court
of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber), 19 April. 
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in Germany, had infringed the Wintersteiger trademark by use of keyword
advertising  placed  on the google.de  website  and that  the use  in question
made  Article  7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation applicable.  The defendant
contested  jurisdiction  arguing  that  advertisement  on a website  registered
under a national top-level domain is directed to users in that country only. 
Hence the question that eventually came before the CJEU regards what
criteria  are  to be  used  to determine  jurisdiction  under  Article  7(2)
of Brussels  Ia  Regulation  to hear  an action  relating  to an alleged
infringement  of a nationally  registered  trademark  through  the use
of a keyword  identical  to that  trademark  on the website  of an Internet
search  engine  operating  under  a top-level  domain  different  from  that
of the Member State where the trademark is registered.16
2.3.2 RULE OF LAW
In relation  to this  question  the rule  of law  that  may  be  derived
from the judgment  of the CJEU may be  framed as follows:  when an actor
places keyword advertising on a website identical to a trademark registered
in a Member  State,  the top-level  domain  under  which  the website
is registered has no influence on the question as to jurisdiction under Article
7(2)  of Brussels  Ia  Regulation.  Thus,  an action  relating  to infringement
in such a case may be brought before either the courts of the Member State
in which  the trademark  is  registered  or  the courts  of the Member  State
of the place of establishment of the advertiser. 
Put differently the CJEU acknowledges the first two jurisdictional heads
of Article  7(2),  but  it  disregards  the third  possibility  that  was  provided
by the eDate & Martinez case.
2.3.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
In its  reasoning  the CJEU  develops  rather  extensively  why
the circumstances in the case differ from those in the eDate & Martinez case,
and it concludes that infringements of personality rights differ in important
aspects  from nationally  registered  trademarks.  Personality  rights  are
protected in all  Member  States,  whereas  nationally registered trademarks
are protected in one country only and a proprietor of such a right  cannot
rely on protection outside the territory of the protecting country.17 It is thus
16 Ibid., § 17.
17 Ibid., § 22–25.
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logical, according to the CJEU, that the protecting country is the only place
where damage in relation to infringement of a national trademark can take
place  and,  therefore,  courts  in that  country  are  best  able  to assess
the infringement claim. Consequently the second jurisdictional head, based
on damage,  of Article  7(2)  is  applicable  in the case  and,  in contrast
to the situation in the Shevill case – taking account to the fact that a national
trademark  is  limited  to the territory  of the protecting  country  –  a court
under  that  jurisdiction,  as a matter  of fact,  will  be  competent  to try  all
the damages  that  occur  whereas  there  is  no  possibility  that  a nationally
registered trademark can be harmed outside of the protecting country.
In relation  to the first  jurisdictional  head  of Article  7(2),  based
on the action  –  i.e.  the event  giving  rise  the damage  –  the CJEU  focus
on the activities performed by the advertiser. It is, according to the CJEU, 
“the activation  by the advertiser  of the technical  process  displaying,
according  to pre-defined  parameters,  the advertisement  which  it  created
for its  own commercial  communications  which should be  considered  to be
the event  giving  rise  to an alleged  infringement,  and not  the display
of the advertisement itself.”18 
In support  of this  finding,  the CJEU  refers  both  to prior  case-law
and the objective of foreseeability arguing that 
“the place of establishment of that server cannot, by reason of its uncertain
location,  be  considered  to be  the place  where  the event  giving  rise
to the damage occurred […].”19
The  finding  in the Wintersteiger  case  is  rather  reactive  than  proactive,
and it is a case that fully supports the idea that intellectual property rights
are territorial and hence best adjudicated in the country of protection.
18 Wintersteiger  AG  v. Products  4U  Sondermaschinenbau  GmbH.  (2012)  case  C-523/10,  Court
of Justice of the European Union (First Chamber), 19 April. § 34.
19 Ibid.,  §  35–36.  See also  Google  France  SARL and Google  Inc.  v. Louis  Vuitton Malletier  SA;
Google  France  SARL  v. Viaticum  SA  and Luteciel  SARL  and Google  France  SARL  v. Centre
national  de  recherche  en  relations  humaines  (CNRRH)  SARL  and Others (2010)  joined  cases
C-236/08, C-237/08 and C-238/08, Court of Justice of the European Union, (Grand Chamber),
23 March 2010. 
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2.4 DATACO
2.4.1 POINT OF LAW 
The next relevant case to mention, after the Wintersteiger  case, is the Third
Chamber’s  judgment  in the Dataco  case.20 The judgment  was  delivered
on 18 October 2012, and it is worth mentioning in relation to the Brussels 1a
Regulation,  although  this  case  primarily  concerns  applicable  law.
The dispute regards certain rights in relation to a database containing data
collected from on-going football  matches.  The proprietor of this database,
a UK-based  company  Football  Dataco,  claimed  that  the Swiss/German
Company Sportsradar had infringed Football Dataco’s rights and brought
infringement actions before a UK court.  In relation to the dispute at hand,
there  was  two  questions:  one  that  related  to the interpretation
of the database  directive  and the concept  of extraction  and re-utilisation
and one  general  question  regaring  where  such  an act  takes  place.
In the following, I will concentrate my analysis on this latter question. 
Thus  the question  that  will  be  dealt  with  regards  cross-border  use
of proprietary  data  and where  such  use  takes  place  in situation  where
the information  is  stored  on a server  in one  country  and made  available
in another.  This  question  relates  in general  terms  to the wider  issue  how
Internet-related  acts  are  to be  delimited  and in that  regard  the problem
is similar  to the discussion  about  “directed  professional  activities”
in the Pammer & Alpenhof case.
The  point  of law  that  is  relevant  in this  part  of the judgment  can
be phrased as follows: in a situation when someone located in one Member
State extracts  information  stored  on a server  in another  Member  State,  is
the act  of extraction taking place in the Member  State  where  the server  is
located,  in the Member  State  where  the information  is  made  available,
or in both those States?21
2.4.2 RULE OF LAW 
In relation  to this  question,  the CJEU  delivers  a rather  open-ended
and inventive  rule  of law.  It  states  that  the act  of extraction  takes  place,
at least,  in the Member  State  where  the information  is  made  available,
where  there  is  evidence  from  which  it  may  be  concluded  that  the act
20 Football  Dataco Ltd and Others  v. Sportradar GmbH and Sportradar AG (2012) case C-173/11,
Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber), 18 October. 
21 Ibid., § 18
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discloses an intention on the part of the person performing the act to target
members of the public in that  Member State. This rule of law is inventive
in as much as it introduces “intention” as a pre-requisite for the localisation
of use in a specific territory and it is open-ended in as much as it does not
specify the closer meaning what “intention to target” may be, although some
guidance is provide for in the reasoning. 
The CJEU refers to the Pammer & Alpenhof case and suggest a similar list
of criteria that  may indicate intention,  namely that  there is  evidence that
business  is  conducted  with  users  in the territory  and whether  country
specific language is used. However, the examples are, in contrast to the list
in the Pammer & Alpenhof  case, not included in the judgment but provided
in the reasoning  obiter  dicta.22 It  is  also worth noticing that  this judgment
primarily deals with the issue whether UK database protection is applicable
and not  to what  extent  UK-courts  have  jurisdiction  to hear  the case,
although  the CJEU  acknowledges  that  the question  of localisation
of a tortious  act  is  liable  to have  an influence  also  on the question
of jurisdiction.23
2.4.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
The reasoning  in the Dataco case  follows  rather  closely  the reasoning
in the Pammer & Alpenhof case  and the findings  from  this  case  is  applied
to a situation in which there are no objective to protect weak party interest.
Specific  account  is  taken  of the ubiquitous  nature  of a website,  and it  is
confirmed  that  the mere  fact  that  a website  is  accessible  in a particular
national territory is not a sufficient basis for the localisation of an tortious
act  in that  territory in relation  to questions  as regards  applicable  national
law. If the mere fact of being accessible were sufficient, the CJEU concludes
that  there  is  a risk  that  certain  conducts  would  wrongly  be  subject
to the application of national laws that should not apply.24
Overall  the reasoning  in the Dataco case  is  attentive  to Internet-related
problems,  and in this  regard  the judgment  may  be  defined  as proactive
rather than reactive. 
22 Football  Dataco Ltd and Others v. Sportradar  GmbH and Sportradar AG (2012) case C-173/11,
Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber), 18 October. § 41–42. 
23 Ibid., § 30.
24 Ibid., § 35–38.
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2.5 PINCKNEY, HI HOTEL, COTY GERMANY AND HEJDUK
2.5.1 POINTS OF LAW
Following  the Third  Chamber’s  decision  in the Dataco  case,  the Forth
Chamber  delivered  a series  of judgments  regarding  the closer  meaning
of Article  7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  in relation  to different  sorts
of infringements:  the Pinckney case  on 3  October  2013,25 the Hi  Hotel case
on 3 April 2014,26 the Coty Germany case on 5 June 201427 and the Hejduk case
on 22 January 2015.28
In these  cases,  there  are  a similar  questions  as regards  international
jurisdiction when the infringement claim is brought before courts in other
Member States than the ones in which the tortious act took place. 
In the Pinckney case,  a composer (and proprietor of copyright)  brought
an infringement action before a French court against an Austrian actor who
had  reproduced  CDs  that  had  been  marketed  and sold  online  by UK
companies. During the proceeding, the defendant contested that there was
international jurisdiction in France; the question arose as to whether Article
7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  must  be  interpreted  as meaning  that
where  there  is  an alleged  infringement  of a copyright  which  is  protected
by the Member State of the court seised, that court has jurisdiction to hear
an action  to establish  liability  brought  by the author  of a work  against
a company established in another Member State, which has reproduced that
work on a material support which is subsequently marketed by companies
established in a third Member State through an Internet site which is also
accessible in the Member State of the court seised.29
In the Hi Hotel case,  different claims regarding copyright infringement
were brought before a court in Germany (Cologne) by a photographer who
had transferred rights to a number of photos of various rooms in a French
hotel  (Hi  Hotel  in Nice)  under  a transfer  agreement  that  limited  the use
of the photos  to Hi  Hotel  only.  The photos  later  appeared  in a book,
25 Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG (2013) case C-170/12, Court of Justice of the European
Union (Forth Chamber), 3 October. 
26 Hi Hotel HCF SARL v. Uwe Spoering (2014) case C-387/12, Court of Justice of the European
Union (Forth Chamber), 3 April. 
27 Coty  Germany  GmbH  v. First  Note  Perfumes  NV (2014)  case  C-360/12,  Court  of Justice
of the European Union (Forth Chamber), 5 June. 
28 Pez  Hejduk  v. EnergieAgentur.NRW  GmbH (2015)  case  C-441/13,  Court  of Justice
of the European Union (Forth Chamber), 22 January. 
29 Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG (2013) case C-170/12, Court of Justice of the European
Union (Forth Chamber), 3 October. § 22.
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published  by a German  publisher,  that  was  available  in a bookshop
in Cologne  and consequently  proceedings  were  brought  there.
The defendant contested jurisdiction and argued that it possibly had made
the photos  available  to the publisher’s  subsidiary  in Paris  and that
it potentially was the subsidiary that passed them on to its German sister
company.  From  the case  it  is  apparent  that  there  are  several  supposed
perpetrators  of the damage  allegedly  caused.  On the basis  of these
conditions  the point  of law in relation  to the proceedings  is  if Article  7(2)
of the  Brussels  Ia  Regulation  should  be  interpreted  as meaning  that
jurisdiction  may be  established  with  respect  to one of those  perpetrators
who did not act within the jurisdiction of the court seised.30
In the Coty  Germany case,  proceedings  were  brought  before  a German
court  against  a Belgian  wholesaler  who  had  sold  perfumes  through
an intermediary in Germany that was claimed to infringe trademark rights
in Germany.  Due  to the fact  that  the trademark  in question  was  an EU
trademark,  protected  under  the EU  trademark  Regulation  (which  also
regulates  the competence  of EU  trademark  courts)31,  the question  that
became  relevant  in relation  to international  jurisdiction  in Germany
regarded separate claims based on national German laws regarding unfair
competition. Such claims are not covered by the EU trademark regulation,
and consequently  there  is  nothing  in the EU  trademark  Regulation  that
prevents those claims from being brought before a court that is competent
under  the Brussels  Ia  Regulation.  The point  of law  that  will  be  further
discussed  is  whether  Article  7(2)  must  be  interpreted  as meaning  that,
in the event of an allegation of unlawful  comparative advertising or unfair
imitation  of a sign  protected  by a EU  trademark,  prohibited  by the law
against  unfair  competition  of the Member  State  in which  the court  seised
is situated,  that  provision  attributes  jurisdiction  to hear  an action
for damages  based  on that  national  law  against  one  of the presumed
perpetrators  who  is  established  in another  Member  State  and is  alleged
to have committed the infringement in that State.32
30 Hi Hotel HCF SARL v. Uwe Spoering (2014) case C-387/12, Court of Justice of the European
Union (Forth Chamber), 3 April. § 23.
31 See further  Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community
trademark  (codified  version)  (EU-trademark  Regulation).  Official  Journal  of the European
Union (2009/L  78/1)  24  March.  Available  from:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2009/207/oj
[Accessed 12 June 2017].
32 Coty  Germany  GmbH  v. First  Note  Perfumes  NV (2014)  case  C-360/12,  Court  of Justice
of the European Union (Forth Chamber), 5 June. § 39.
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And finally, in the Hejduk case, claims regarding copyright infringement
were brought  before  an Austrian court  against  a German defendant  who
had  published  photos  on a German  website  supposedly  not  directed
at Austria.  The point of law was whether Article 7(2) must be interpreted
as meaning  that,  in the event  of an allegation  of infringement  of rights
related to copyright which are guaranteed by the Member State of the court
seised, that court has jurisdiction to hear an action for damages in respect
of an  infringement  of those  rights  resulting from the placing  of protected
photographs online on a website accessible in its territorial jurisdiction.33
Simply put,  the point of law in these four cases  regards how acts  that
constitute distance delict, e.g. tortious act that takes place in one jurisdiction
and that  have  effect  in another,  are  to be  handled  within  the frames
of Article  7(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation;  it  is  therefore  appropriate
to summarise the findings in one general rule of law.
2.5.2 RULES OF LAW 
Read together,  the rule of law that  may be derived from these four cases
may be framed as follows: Article 7(2) provides for international jurisdiction
based  on the fact  that  damage  occurred  in the Member  State  of the court
seised,  and that  court  will  be  competent  as regards  damage  that  occurs
in that  country  following  an infringement  conducted  by a defendant
domiciled in another Member State who has made copyright or trademark
protected works  assessable  from the state  of the court  seised,  irrespective
of the  fact  that  the defendant  did  not  act  in that  state.  In this  regard,
it is irrelevant  if the defendant  acted  through  intermediaries  in other
Member  States.  If jurisdiction  is  based  on the occurrences  of damages,
the only prerequisite that is relevant is whether or not damage may occur
in the Member Sate of the court seised, and regarding online infringement,
it  is  sufficient  for international  jurisdiction under  Article  7(2)  if protected
works has been made accessible in the country of the court. 
2.5.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
In their  reasoning,  the Fourth  Chamber  relates  to the Shevill  case  in its
assessment of jurisdiction under Article 7(2). The third jurisdictional head
that  was  introduced  in the eDate & Martinez case is  not  applicable,
33 Pez  Hejduk  v. EnergieAgentur.NRW  GmbH (2015)  case  C-441/13,  Court  of Justice
of the European Union (Forth Chamber), 22 January. § 15.
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nor is the discussion  regarding  intention  to target  from  the Dataco case.
Instead  the Fourth  Chamber  confirms  the idea  that  infringement  claims
based on national rights are best adjudicated in a court where the damage
occurred  ( in a court  where  the act  took  place  –  which  in the four  cases
coincides with the courts of the defendant’s domicile).
In this  regard,  the judgments  from  the Fourth  Chamber  are  obvious
examples  of reactive  innovation  where  the CJEU  is  applying  existing
knowledge to further develop that understanding of Article 7(2).
2.6 EL MAJDOUB 
2.6.1 POINT OF LAW
The next Internet-related case of relevance is the El Majdoub case, which was
delivered  by the Third  Chamber  on 21  May  2015.34 The dispute  regarded
an agreement  to purchase  an electric  car  which,  after  the conclusion
of the sales  contract,  was  cancelled.  The parties  to the dispute  had
dissenting  opinions  as regarded  the reasons  for the cancellation,
and the purchaser  (a car  dealer  established  in Cologne)  brought  action
before  a court  in Krefeld  (Germany)  regarding  the transfer  of ownership
of the vehicle  in question.  In that  situation,  the defendant  (the seller)
claimed that there was no jurisdiction. The principal argument in support
of that claim was that a prorogation clause conferring jurisdiction on a court
in Leuven  (Belgium)  was  included  in the general  terms  and conditions
for Internet sales transactions and that this clause was applicable in the case
due to the fact  that  the purchase was made from the sellers website,  from
which the terms and conditions was presented by way of a pop-up window
that  appeared and had to be  clicked on in order to complete  the purchase
(i.e. click wrap agreement). 
The question arose whether  or not the terms and conditions (including
the prorogation  clause)  had  been  validly  incorporated  into the sale
agreement.  In Article  25(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation,  it  is  made  clear
that a written prorogation clause provides for jurisdiction and that 
“any communication by electronic  means which provides a durable record
of the agreement shall be equivalent to writing.”
34 Jaouad El Majdoub v. CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH (2015) case C-322/14, Court of Justice
of the European Union (Third Chamber), 21 May.
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Thus, the point of law that became relevant in the El Majdoub case was
whether  Article 25(2)  of the Brussels  Ia  Regulation  must  be  interpreted
as meaning  that  the method  of accepting  general  terms  and conditions
of contract for sale by “click-wrapping”, concluded electronically, containing
an agreement  conferring  jurisdiction,  constitutes  a communication
by electronic  means  capable  of providing  a durable  record  of that
agreement within the meaning of that provision.35
2.6.2 RULE OF LAW 
As a response  to the question  raised,  the CJEU  gave  a rather  straight
forward answer. The rule of law derive from the case is that Article 25(2)
must  be  interpreted  as meaning  that  the method  of accepting  the general
terms  and conditions  of a contract  for  sale  by “click-wrapping”,  concluded
by electronic means,  which contains  an agreement  conferring jurisdiction,
constitutes a communication by electronic means which provides a durable
record of the agreement  within the meaning  of that  provision,  where  that
method  makes  it  possible  to print  and save  the text  of those  terms
and conditions before the conclusion of the contract.36
2.6.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
The El Majdoub case concerns a novel question, and in that regard the case
is a landmark case addressing a new Internet-related question for the first
time. This may explain why the CJEU is rather developed in its reasoning.
It starts  out  with  a clear  reference  to the old  Brussels  Convention37
and the fact that Article 25(2) was included in the first Brussels Regulation
for a reason [at the time the rule was placed in Article 23(2)], namely to take
account  to the development  of new  methods  of communication.38 It  then
places importance on the wording and uses a literal interpretation to reach
the conclusion  that  Article  25(2)  is  about  providing  a possibility,  not
a requirement  that  there  should  be  a physical  record  of the agreement.39
35 Ibid., § 20.
36 Ibid., § 40.
37 1968  Brussels  Convention  on jurisdiction  and the enforcement  of judgments  in civil
and commercial  matters  (Consolidated  version),  Official  Journal  of the European  Union
(1998/C 27/1) 26 January. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=OJ:C:1998:027:TOC [Accessed 12 June 2017].
38 Jaouad El Majdoub v. CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH (2015) case C-322/14, Court of Justice
of the European Union (Third Chamber), 21 May. § 32.
39 Ibid., § 33–34.
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In this  regard,  Article  25(2)  differs  from  seemingly  similar  provisions
regarding  protection  of consumers  in respect  of distance  contracts,
e.g. Article  5(1)  of Directive  97/7/EC,40 which  expressively  states  that
the consumer must receive written confirmation.41 Due to the fact that there
is no expressed consumer protection objective in relation to the application
of Article  25(2),  case-law regarding the application of directive  97/7/EC is
not relevant in relation to the understanding of Article 25(2) of the Brussels
Ia Regulation.42
In reaching the conclusion that there should be no requirement that there
are  written  records  of a potential  agreement  on jurisdiction,  only
a possibility  to record  a durable  evidence  of that  agreement,  I  would
describe  the reasoning  and the rule  of law  in this  case  as reactive  even
though it deals with a novel issue. It should be acknowledged that the CJEU
establishes  a new  standard  for click-wrap  agreements,  but  they  do  not
invent  the idea  that  a click-wrap  solution  could  amount  to a binding
agreement; they rather reason in relation to existing knowledge and apply
that knowledge in relation to a new problem, hence an example of reactive
rather than proactive innovation.
2.7 CONCURRENCE
2.7.1 POINT OF LAW
The final  case  that  will  be  covered  in this  paper  is  the Third  Chamber’s
judgment  on 21  December  2016  in the Concurrence case.43 In this  case
a French retailer, Concurrence, brought action against Samsung as regarded
a selective distribution agreement that prevented Concurrence from selling
Samsung products through its website. Concurrence questioned the legality
of this  part  of the agreement,  with  reference  to the fact  that  several  other
retailers  where  allowed  to conduct  online  sales.  In the dispute  before
the French court, Concurrence brought actions in relation to both Samsung,
regarding the selective distribution agreement, and against several branches
40 Directive  97/7/EC  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 20  May  1997
on the protection  of consumers  in respect  of distance  contracts.  Official  Journal
of the European Union (1997/L 144/19) 4 June. Available from:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/
1997/7/oj [Accessed 12 June 2017].
41 Jaouad El Majdoub v. CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH (2015) case C-322/14, Court of Justice
of the European Union (Third Chamber), 21 May. § 37–38.
42 Ibid., § 38.
43 Concurrence Sàrl  v. Samsung Electronics  France SAS and Amazon Services Europe Sàrl (2016)
case C-618/15, Court of Justice of the European Union (Third Chamber), 21 December.
2017] U. Maunsbach: The CJEU as an Innovator ... 97
of Amazon  with  the view  to obtain  an order  requiring  the withdrawal
of any  offers  for sale  of Samsung  products  directed  to the French  market
that  affected  Concurrence  position  as distributor  of those  products.
The lower  instances  dismissed  the claims  against  Amazon  due  to lack
of jurisdiction and the case  was  appealed to the Court  of Cassation  which
decided  to stay  proceedings  and forward  a preliminarily  question
to the CJEU. 
The point  of law  relevant  in the case  may  be  framed  as follows:  how
shall  Article 7(2)  of Brussels  Ia  Regulation be  interpreted for the purpose
of conferring  the jurisdiction  given  by that  provision  to hear  an action
to establish  liability  for infringement  of the prohibition  on resale  outside
a selective distribution network resulting from offers, on websites operated
in various Member States, of products covered by that network.44
2.7.2 RULE OF LAW 
In response to the questions asked, the Third Chamber provides a judgment
that  comprises  a rule  of law  that  states  that  Article 7(2)  of Brussels  Ia
Regulation  must  be  interpreted,  for the purpose  of conferring
the jurisdiction given by that provision to hear an action to establish liability
for infringement of the prohibition on resale outside a selective distribution
network  resulting  from  offers,  on websites  operated  in various  Member
States,  of products  covered  by that  network,  as meaning  that  the place
where the damage occurred is to be regarded as the territory of the Member
State  which  protects  the prohibition  on resale  by means  of the action
at issue,  a territory  on which  the appellant  alleges  to have  suffered
a reduction in its sales.45
2.7.3 MODE OF PROCEDURE
This  case  is  closely  linked  to the line  of case-law  already  derived
from the CJEU,  and it  supports  the idea  that  courts  in countries  in which
tortious effect occurs will always be component to try claims regarding that
effect.  It has  been  emphasised  in relation  to infringements  of intellectual
property  rights,  in relation  to unfair  marketing  activities  and now
in relation  to loss  in sales  as regards  claims  based  on arguments  related
to acts of unfair competition and selective distribution arrangements. In this
44 Ibid., § 24.
45 Ibid., § 35.
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regard,  this  is a case  that  confirms  the strict  application  of Article  7(2)
in as much  as it places  importance  on the difference  between  the place
where action was committed and the place where damaged occurs; courts
in this  latter  place  are  best  equipped  to assess  claims  in relation
to the damage  that  occurred  in that  country.  Hence,  the Third  Chamber
in this case proves to adhere to reactive innovation.
3. CONCLUSIONS
After  having  assessed  the Internet  related  cases  chosen  for  this  paper,
with the ambition to penetrate the findings in light of innovation theory, it
is now time to draw some tentative conclusions. 
One  observation  would  be  that  the CJEU  is  reactive  rather  than
proactive. Among the cases dealt with in this paper only two can be defined
as proactive,  the eDate  & Martinez case  from  the Grand  Chamber
and the Dataco case  from  the Third  Chamber,  in as  much  as the CJEU
in those  two  cases  actually  invented  new solutions.  Interestingly  enough
it is  apparent  that  these  inventive  solutions  has  not  yet  been  confirmed
and applied  in later  case-law.  In contrast  to this,  it  may  be  stated  that
reactive  cases  are  more  frequently  followed.  This  may  be  explained
by the obvious reason that it is more appropriate to deliver a judgment that
is in line with prior case-law than it is to start from a blank sheet and invent
a new solution. It may also be stated that there are reasons to be cautious
in relation to inventiveness, due to the fact that inventive solutions are less
likely to be accepted as a logical continuation of the legal development. 
Another reflection in relation to the proactive solution that was chosen
in the  Dataco case is that this case actually deals with choice of law rather
than jurisdiction.  In this regard,  it  can  be  concluded that  there  are  more
profound reasons to be cautious as to the interpretation of rules regarding
jurisdiction, due to the fact that it is inappropriate to investigate substantive
issues at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings, which may be required
if the circumstances  of the case  are  to be  assessed  in a proactive  way.
The fact  that  the issue  in the Dataco case  related  to the application
of national (substantive) law may be the primary reason that explains why
the Third Chamber dared to invent a new solution. 
As regards  the organisation  of the CJEU  in different  chambers,  it  can
furthermore  be  concluded,  perhaps  not  surprisingly,  that  inventiveness
and proactive innovation primarily seems to reside in the Grand Chamber
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and that  the separate  chambers,  with the exception of the Third Chamber,
adhere  to reactive  innovation in as  much as they  are  more  literal  in their
approach to the problems at hand and more faithful to prior case-law. 
From  this  analysis  a cautious  conclusion  may  be  drawn  in relation
to a plaintiff  that  is  about  to bring  proceedings  before  a court.  It  matters
how  the claims  are  framed.  If the plaintiff  wants  to plead  for new
inventions,  it  may  prove  problematic  if the preliminary  question  regards
jurisdiction,  and if that  is  the case,  the remaining  hope  for  an inventive
solution  is  that  the CJEU  decides  to answer  the question  at hand
with a judgment  from  the Grand  Chamber.  if the ambition  is  to urge
for inventiveness,  which  by no  reason  must  be  a preferred  choice,  there
seems  to be  better  odds  to get  a proactive  judgment  if the preliminary
questions deals with substantive law. In this regard, it may be stated that
the parties to a dispute, irrespective of the fact that it is the national courts
that  formulate  preliminary  questions,  have  an influence
over the proceedings by the way they actually formulates their claims. 
A final  conclusion,  in line with the theme of this paper,  would be that
the analysis  confirms  that  the CJEU  is  predominantly  reactive  in its
approach  to innovation.  When  it  has  challenged  the conventions  –
and adhered  to proactive  innovation  –  it  has  seemingly  delivered  less
influential  judgments.  This  conclusion supports  the idea that courts  shall
primarily  be  reactive  and listening  –  and that  there  is  a danger  if courts
adhere  to untamed  inventiveness.  Better  to listen  to the development
and adhere  closely  to a logical  line  of cases  bearing  in mind  that
it is sensitive  to speed  up  the legal  development.  In this  regard,  legal
developments, according to the CJEU, resemble a slogan that would be fit
for a Volvo: drive safe.
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